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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the relation between Unfaithful Disclosure Corporations (“UDC”) and corporate governance 
using listed firm (KOSPI and KOSDAQ) data in Korea. Prior literature reports that corporate governance has an 
impact on the level of disclosure and the quality of disclosure provided by companies. However, it is hard to find the 
studies about corporate governance and UDC at the term of disclosure quality. Compare to some financially advanced 
countries, Korea established corporate governance in a relatively short period of time; hence concerns have been 
raised the corporate governance have not played effective role to monitor management. We question how corporate 
governance affects companies’ unfaithful disclosure by using several corporate governance proxy variables and UDC 
data which is unique system in Korea. 
 
From the empirical tests, we find a negative association between the proportion of outside directors, an indicator of 
the board’s independence, and UDC designation, among companies listed on both KOSPI and KOSDAQ. On the 
other hand, there is a significant positive association between the proportion of outside directors and UDCs’ imposed 
and accumulated penalty points among KOSDAQ-listed companies. This implies that outside director system 
effectively play a monitoring role however due to different natures of members included in outside directors, the 
system often fails to control regarding based reasons for penalty points imposition. In addition, we find the percentage 
of foreign equity ownership showed statistically significant positive association with UDC designation and a 
significant positive association with the imposed and accumulated penalty points among KOSPI-listed companies. We 
interpret this results that foreign investors with a short-term investment propensity may not enough to play a proper 
monitoring role in Korea and thereby they cannot effectively control the disclosure quality provided by the 
management. We also find that there is a significant positive association between the percentage of managerial 
ownership and UDC designation in the KOSDAQ market.   
 
This study will contribute to academics and disclosure-related practitioners by documenting about corporate 
governance and its impact on unfaithful disclosure corporations. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Outside Directors; Foreign Investors; Management Ownership; Unfaithful 
Disclosure Corporation 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between Unfaithful Disclosure Corporations 
(“UDC”) and corporate governance. In particular, to understand the link between corporate governance 
and UDC designation/imposition of penalty points, we explored how corporate governance affects 
companies’ unfaithful disclosure, by using and measuring the percentage of outside directors, the percentage of foreign 
ownership and that of managerial ownership as proxy variables.  
 
Mandatory and voluntary disclosure are the useful channels for outside information users to access companies’ 
financial information; thus, they decrease information asymmetry. Timely and accurate disclosure allows an efficient 
allocation of resources. However, if disclosure is not transparent, containing overstated, understated or hidden 
T 
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information in it, information users cannot make reasonable decisions based on such unreliable source of information. 
Also, if managers attempt to present misleading information out of their opportunistic considerations or for ulterior 
motives, information users would end up suffering losses. Hence, regulatory measures are necessary to ensure that 
companies disclose information fairly and accurately, causing no confusion to the capital market. 
 
To this end, Korea Exchange came up with a regulation to designate UDCs if listed companies 1) fail to comply with 
the Securities Exchange Act and the disclosure obligation by Korea Securities and Futures Exchange, and 2) breach 
the disclosure obligation, i.e., perform non-disclosure, reversal or alteration of disclosed information; companies 
falling under the above category are designated as UDCs1 and placed under the supervision of Korea Exchange. UDCs 
are subject to certain penalty measures ranging from trading suspension, prevention education, designation as 
administrative issue, request for submission of improvement plan to delisting; such measures are determined 
depending on the severity of unfaithful disclosure behavior. UDCs may also be subject to a fine of up to KRW 200 
million and imposition of penalty points. Trading for UDCs with 5 penalty points or more is suspended for one trading 
day, and if UDCs have accumulated 15 penalty points or more within a year, it is designated as administrative issue. 
And if an administrative issue receives 15 accumulated penalty points or more within one year after receiving the 
administrative issue, it shall receive a listing maintenance review. Being designated as UDCs means that errors exist 
in timeliness, accuracy and reliability of disclosed information; thus, the higher accumulated penalty points are, the 
more severe the breach of disclosure is. As Korea Exchange and securities brokers provide public announcement for 
UDC designation, reasons for designation and penalty points on their online system, unfaithful disclosure is believed 
to bring immediate and negative consequences to UDCs, such as bad impression and loss of reputation.2 
 
Corporate governance is a system used to supervise and monitor companies’ business in an independent manner; its 
purpose is to curb managers’ opportunistic behavior and maximize ultimate shareholder value. In Korea, corporate 
governance emerged as a key management issue in the aftermath of the financial crisis in the late 1990s. Since then, 
Korean companies have shown remarkable improvement in corporate governance, as diverse efforts have been made 
to promote management transparency and healthy economic growth. In fact, a few research in the field of finance and 
accounting proved that good corporate governance leads to increased level of disclosure (Lee & Sohn, 2005; Lee, 
Shim & Choi, 2012).  
 
In general, good corporate governance plays an effective role in monitoring and supervising management actions; this 
leads to better decision making by the management, and information risks faced by shareholders and agency costs are 
consequently mitigated (Ashbaugh, Collins & LaFond, 2006; Byun, Kwak & Hwang, 2008). In the Korean business 
community, however, concerns have been raised that the outside director system and foreign ownership, the most 
common forms of corporate governance, have not been effective enough to monitor management actions. Unlike some 
financially advanced countries, Korea established corporate governance in a relatively short period of time as a 
mechanism to cope with external factors; creating a regulatory framework was the main concern, so companies do not 
always feel the intended benefit of adopting corporate governance. In addition, in Korea, outside directors are mostly 
appointed on the recommendation of the majority shareholder or incumbent managers, making the outside director 
system less independent and less capable (Lee, Park, & Choi 2001). In terms of foreign investment, some foreign 
investors’ extreme profiteering has been frowned upon, i.e., foreign investors ask for higher dividends by taking 
advantage of their right as a large shareholder, and focus on short-term profit harvesting and predatory investment 
strategy. As such, we believed an empirical analysis would help us understand whether corporate governance prevents 
unfaithful disclosure by monitoring managers’ opportunistic considerations and ulterior motives and capturing errors 
in financial disclosure. In our empirical analysis, we used the proportion of outside directors, the percentage of foreign 
ownership and that of managerial ownership as proxy variables; using such variables, we explored whether corporate 
governance has a positive or negative influence on UDC designation and imposition of penalty points. Prior studies 
have been limited to explaining the relationship between corporate governance and the level of disclosure, measured 
by the frequency of disclosure, due to data insufficiency; our work takes a more detailed look, with our focus on 
explaining the relationship between corporate governance and UDC designation and accumulated penalty points.  
																																								 																				
1 Companies may be designated as UDCs not only if their annual reports do not comply with the disclosure obligation, but also if their timely 
disclosure, fair disclosure, inquired disclosure and voluntary disclosure breach the obligation.  
2 Lee, Park and Lee (2014) observed the capital market reaction concerning UDC designation and imposition of penalty points. Their study shows 
that responses from the capital market were more negative when UDCs have higher penalty points. 
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An empirical analysis of companies listed on KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2000 to 2015 as to the correlation between 
corporate governance and UDC designation/penalty points produced the following results. First, there was significant 
negative association between the proportion of outside directors, an indicator of the board’s independence, and UDC 
designation, among companies listed on both KOSPI and KOSDAQ. This implies that outside director system checks 
and balances the management, thereby effectively playing the role of reducing errors in timeliness, accuracy and 
reliability of disclosed information. On the other hand, we could find a significant positive association between the 
proportion of outside directors and UDCs’ imposed and accumulated penalty points among KOSDAQ-listed 
companies. This mixed result seems to be attributable to different natures of members included in the proportion of 
outside directors. A board of directors (“BOD”) is composed mainly of inside directors, grey directors and outside 
directors (Baysinger & Butler 1985). Grey directors are those who are counted in the proportion of outside directors 
as they technically do not take part in the management, but in fact not independent from the firm or the management. 
Due to the unique nature of Korea’s BOD composition, represented by interests or school ties3, the outside director 
system often fails to control the situation which leads the UDCs to receive penalty points. Second, the percentage of 
foreign equity ownership showed statistically significant positive association with UDC designation and a significant 
positive association with the imposed and accumulated penalty points among KOSPI-listed companies. This may 
indicate that if foreign investors, albeit their high equity ownership, have a short-term investment propensity, they fail 
to play a proper monitoring role (Kim & Kwak, 2013), and therefore cannot effectively control the quality of disclosed 
information provided by the management. Foreign equity ownership was found to have failed to properly monitor and 
control unfaithful disclosure in the KOSDAQ market. According to Financial Supervisory Service, the percentage of 
foreign equity ownership was 32% in KOSPI and 17% in KOSDAQ as of 2007, before the global credit crisis, showing 
foreign investors’ preference for KOSPI companies. Among KOSDAQ companies, when other ownership-related 
variables are factored in, foreign ownership showed a negative effect on corporate values (Kim, 2010). Third, there 
was a significant positive association between the percentage of managerial ownership and UDC designation in the 
KOSDAQ market. The higher the managerial ownership, the less agency problem there is between shareholders and 
the management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which reduces the need for supervising the management, pressure for 
disclosure and therefore the level of disclosure (Mak, 1991), and its quality. This is in line with the result of research 
by Sepasi, Kazempour and Mansourlakoraj (2016), which concluded there was significant negative correlation 
between the managerial ownership percentage and disclosure quality. On the other hand, there was a significant 
negative correlation between the managerial ownership percentage and the imposed and accumulated penalty points 
in the KOSDAQ market. This illustrates the fact that even though the higher managerial ownership decreases the 
agency problem and the level and the quality of disclosures, however, the lowered disclosure level and the quality of 
disclosure are not serious enough to receive the UDC penalty points of designating as issues for administration and 
delisting. 
 
This paper contributes to earlier literature in the following ways: first, we propose the influence of corporate 
governance through empirical study of relationships between corporate governance and designation and imposition 
penalty scores on UDC in Korea’s stock market. Second, even though some already have explored the effect of 
corporate governance on corporate disclosures (Hope & Thomas, 2008; Lee & Sohn, 2005; Lee et al. 2012; Oh & 
Shin, 2016) and aspects of unfaithful disclosure corporations (Sohn, Chae & Oh, 2012; Lee, Park & Lee, 2014) but 
we investigated a more detailed look by using unique unfaithful disclosure corporation data in Korea, i.e., designation 
of UDC and imposition of penalty points on UDC. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides review of previous literature and hypotheses used in 
the paper. Section III discusses analysis methodology, and Section IV describes the result of empirical analysis and 
its interpretation. Finally, Section V concludes with implications of the analysis. 
 
  
																																								 																				
3 The ratio of outside directors with direct interests was 19.97% in 2006 and 18.95% in 2007, and that of such directors with both direct interests 
and school ties was 37.50% in 2006 and 35.44% in 2007, indicating little improvement in outside directors’ independence. In fact, many appointed 
outside directors are not independent from controlling shareholders and the management, therefore not expected to check and balance them. 
(Economic Reform Report 2007-6, Center for Good Corporate Governance) 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2017 Volume 33, Number 5 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 890 The Clute Institute 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Unfaithful Disclosure Corporations 
 
Previous studies on unfaithful disclosure system have mainly explored how disclosure quality degradation caused by 
UDC designation impacts a company’s stakeholders and its reputation in the capital market. Lee, Chun and Park 
(2008) investigated the impact of disclosure quality degradation caused by UDC designation on the cost of debt based 
on a sample of UDCs in the KOSPI and KOSDAQ market from 1999 to 2005. This empirical study found that UDCs 
had to bear a relatively higher cost of debt compared to non-UDCs. This shows how creditors view UDCs. Lee et al. 
(2012) analyzed whether auditors put in additional audit hours for companies designated as UDC and as a result charge 
additional audit fees.  
 
The result shows that auditors of companies listed in the KOSPI market recognize the designation as UDC as an audit 
risk and charge additional fee by putting in extra audit hours. Sohn et al. (2012) verified if UDC designation and the 
penalty point system impact external auditors’ declaration of review and audit opinion of the Internal Accounting 
Control System. The result shows that companies designated as a UDC or with high accumulated penalty points is 
more likely to receive a review/audit opinion of the Internal Accounting Control System that is other than unqualified. 
Lee et al. (2014) examined how the capital market responds to companies designated as UDC and their penalty points. 
The study found that the stocks’ rate of return dropped on the first trading day after the companies’ UDC designation, 
with a statistically significant negative excess earning rate. It also revealed that the higher the accumulated penalty 
points, the more negatively the capital market responds to UDCs.    
 
Previous studies have so far been aimed at inspecting the effect of unfaithful disclosure in the capital market, whereas 
this study focuses on corporate governance as a factor affecting such practices, and the correlation between these two. 
Since unfaithful disclosure is highly likely to be intended by the management (Sohn, 2001), companies with excellent 
corporate governance, a system designed to monitor and control the management’s opportunistic behavior, are 
expected to be less inclined to disclose unfaithfully. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance and Disclosures 
 
Corporate Governance is a system which mediates the interests of shareholders, BOD, the management and other 
main stakeholders, and monitors and controls the decision-making process to maximize the corporate values. Among 
many theories of corporate governance, the main theory related to the study of accounting is the agency theory (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). When ownership and control are separated, the management is often 
tempted to opt for a decision which would maximize their personal benefit, instead of corporate values. Therefore, an 
effective control mechanism becomes necessary to monitor such decisions. Excellent corporate governance is a 
mechanism of eliminating or alleviating agency problems, monitoring and controlling the management’s behavior, 
thereby protecting information users who have relatively less information on the company’s management. Corporate 
disclosure acts to ease the information asymmetry between companies and investors (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991), 
enabling efficient distribution of resources. The management is sometimes motivated to volunteer to disclose reliable 
information, but at the same time tempted to hide or intentionally distort information to maximize their personal 
benefits. Therefore, excellent corporate governance may be expected to properly monitor the management’s 
opportunistic practices and provide the market with timely and reliable information.    
 
A number of studies have been conducted on how corporate governance impacts the company’s overall policies and 
level of disclosure. Hope and Thomas (2008) suggested that if the manager dominates the governance with his/her 
solid position, the company shows a lower level of disclosure. If a mechanism designed to monitor and check the 
management fails, it exacerbates the agency problem and the management may make a decision against the 
shareholders’ interests. Lee and Sohn (2005) verified if corporate governance impacts the level of disclosure, measured 
by the number of disclosures. The result indicated that the level of BOD independence, percentage of foreign and 
institutional investors’ equity ownership were proportionate to the level of disclosure. Also, companies with an audit 
committee had a higher level of disclosure than their counterparts without audit committees, and companies with 
lower managerial equity ownership had a higher level of disclosure. Lee et al. (2012) inspected the correlation between 
corporate governance measured by the BOD characteristics and the frequency of disclosures through Fair Disclosure. 
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It concluded that the more expertise and independence the BOD has, the more frequent the company discloses 
information. Oh and Shin (2016) probed into the impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure and 
information asymmetry after the K-IFRS introduction. This empirical analysis found that companies which 
volunteered to disclose information showed higher information asymmetry, and corporate governance works to 
alleviate the adverse effects of voluntary disclosure.   
 
Meanwhile, there is little study on the impact of corporate governance on unfaithful disclosure. Therefore, this study 
will focus on the role of corporate governance as a factor impacting UDC designation and penalty points, which are 
direct measures of quality of disclosed information provided by the management. 
 
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
 
The responsibility of BOD is to supervise the management, to take part in critical decision-making process and to 
provide advisory input (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Forker (1992) noted that inclusion of outside director on the board 
enhances independence, and companies are more likely to comply with the disclosure obligation and provide higher-
quality financial information. Other studies suggested that independent BOD tend to exercise more supervision on the 
management; this, in turn, limits the possibility of accounting fraud, reduces the likelihood of correcting past financial 
statements and increases the frequency of disclosure. Chen and Jaggi (2000), Eng and Mak (2003) and Ajinkya, 
Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005) suggested companies with a greater proportion of outside directors are more likely to 
issue accurate management forecast, arguing that a lower proportion of outside directors or lower institutional 
ownership leads to less frequent forecasts. Lee and Sohn (2005) found that a lower proportion of outside directors is 
associated with decreased accuracy of disclosure. On the contrary, some studies showed independent BOD may not 
play an effective role of management supervision. Kim (2006) showed no relation between the proportion of outside 
directors and firm value, and Lee, Kim and Jung (2010) reported a significant positive relation between the proportion 
of outside directors and asset misappropriation. While a BOD is believed to be a critical mechanism to supervise the 
management and resolve the agency problem between shareholders and managers, there are conflicting results whether 
independent BOD affects the role of supervision in a positive way. It needs to be seen whether independent BOD 
would prevent managers’ opportunistic behavior and make the managers less motivated to distort information, 
resulting in less likelihood of UDC designation /penalty points. Interestingly, outside directors in US companies are 
generally appointed based on their competence and roles in the organization, whereas the appointment of outside 
directors in the Korean companies is mostly a regulatory compliance, i.e., companies shall have a certain minimum 
of outside directors depending on their total asset size. In this regard, findings from the US analysis may not hold true 
for Korean companies. Thus, in this study, WE used the following null hypotheses, Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2, to analyze 
how the independent BOD, measured by the proportion of outside directors, influences UDC designation/penalty 
points: 
 
Hypothesis 1-1: There is no significant relationship between the independent BOD (measured by the proportion of 
outside directors) and UDC designation. 
 
Hypothesis 1-2: There is no significant relationship between the independent BOD (measured by the proportion of 
outside directors) and penalty points. 
 
Prior research reported that foreign investors are familiar with advanced investment practice and play an effective role 
of management supervision, so companies invested by foreigners tend to disclose accurate earnings information; and 
the existence of foreign investors also helps companies increase financing activities such as distribution of dividends 
and investment, resulting in enhanced corporate value (Rho, Bae, & Cheon, 2003; Kim & Kim, 2007; Chung, Ho & 
Kim 2004). Sachs and Warner (1995) also found that foreign investors are proactive in supervising the management 
because supervision can be a means to reduce information costs arising from information asymmetry between 
domestic investors and foreign investors. In other words, foreign investors are known to reduce agency costs thanks 
to their advanced investment knowledge and proactive supervision.  
 
In contrast, some studies discuss that foreign investors bring more harm than good to companies. In fact, some 
companies have experienced adverse effects from foreign investment; companies cannot create sustainable value if 
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foreign investors ask for higher dividends by taking advantage of their right as a large shareholder, and focus on short-
term profit harvesting by threatening or controlling the management. (Park & Lee, 2006; Kim & Cheon, 2004). 
 
It may be predicted that the higher the percentage of foreign ownership is, the less likely a company would be 
designated as a UDC; the management and the decision-making process would be effectively supervised and 
controlled by foreign investors, leading to more accurate information disclosure. On the contrary, some might argue 
that foreign investors are mostly interested in high dividends and short-term profit, so they would not play an effective 
monitoring role on the management and this affects a company being designated as UDC and receiving penalties. 
With such conflicting views on foreign investors’ influence on disclosure, WE used the following null hypotheses, 
Hypotheses 2-1 and 2-2, to analyze how corporate governance, measured by the percentage of foreign equity 
ownership, influences UDC designation/penalty points: 
 
Hypothesis 2-1: There is no significant relationship between the percentage of foreign equity ownership and UDC 
designation. 
 
Hypothesis 2-2: There is no significant relationship between the percentage of foreign equity ownership and the 
penalty points. 
 
Generally, it is known that corporate ownership structure has a huge influence on the level of disclosure. Prior studies 
reported that there is a significant negative correlation between managerial ownership and the level of disclosure 
(Mak, 1991; Eng & Mak, 2003). Increased managerial ownership aligns the interest between shareholders and 
managers, reducing the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976); under this circumstance, no one forces companies 
to issue disclosure, which ends up compromising the level of disclosure. Sepasi et al. (2016) discovered that 
managerial ownership has a significant negative effect on disclosure quality. According to Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988), if managers have a certain percentage of corporate ownership, they are more likely to pursue 
perquisite-taking and non-value-maximizing behavior. The higher managerial ownership is, the more likelihood that 
managers are motivated to issue distorted information to maximize their personal benefits. Thus, we can expect that 
the percentage of managerial equity ownership and UDC designation/penalty points would be positively related. On 
the other hand, a higher managerial ownership reduces the agency problem and managers are more motivated to 
publicly disseminate private information to the market (Nagar, Nanda & Wysocki 2003). In this case, the percentage 
of managerial equity ownership and UDC designation/penalty points would be positively related. Thus, WE used the 
following null hypotheses, Hypotheses 3-1 and 3-2, to analyze how the percentage of managerial equity ownership 
influences UDC designation and penalty points: 
 
Hypothesis 3-1: There is no significant relationship between the percentage of managerial equity ownership and UDC 
designation. 
 
Hypothesis 3-2: There is no significant relationship between the percentage of managerial equity ownership and 
penalty points. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Methodology and Variable Definitions 
 
We built the following formula to empirically analyze how corporate governance influences UDC designation and the 
penalty points, using the proportion of outside directors, the percentage of foreign ownership and that of managerial 
ownership as proxies. 
 𝑈𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑇𝐻𝐹𝑈𝐿	𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽4	𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸 + 𝛽7	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽9	𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽:	𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽;	𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇 +𝛽<	𝑂𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽=	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽?𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽@	𝐵𝐼𝐺 + 𝛽42𝑀𝐾𝑇 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 + 𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 
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Where 
 
UNFAITHFUL DISCLOSURE: UNFAITH, D_score, CD_score. 
UNFAITH = an indicator variable that equals 1 for Unfaithful disclosure corporation, 0 otherwise  
D_score = current period penalty points imposed on unfaithful disclosure corporations 
CD_score = accumulated penalty points imposed on unfaithful disclosure corporations 
GOVERNANCE: OUTDIR, FRGN. MNGR 
OUTDIR = the proportion of outside directors on corporate boards 
FRGN = the percentage of equity ownership by foreign investors 
MNGR = the percentage of equity ownership by chief executive owners 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets value of a firm 
LEV = firm leverage measures as the ratio of total liabilities to total asset 
ROA = return on assets to measure firms’ performance 
LIST = the number of years since the original listing 
OIVOL = the standard deviation of operating income for past three years including = current year 
GROW = the average percentage change in sales 
ZSCORE = bankruptcy risk 
BIG = a dummy variable with a value of 1 when auditors belong to big accounting firm and a 
value of 0 otherwise 
MKT = a dummy variable  
 
with a value of 1 when a firm is listed in KOSPI and a value of 0 otherwise 
 
First, UDC designation and imposed/accumulated penalty points are applied to the dependent variable UNFAITHFUL 
DISCLOSURE. The independent variable of interest (𝛽4	 ) uses proportion of outside directors (OUTDIR) for 
verification of hypothesis 1, percentage of foreign equity ownership (FRGN) for hypothesis 2, and percentage of 
managerial equity ownership(MNGR) for hypothesis 3. In addition, following variables have been controlled as they 
are believed to affect UDC designation and penalty points. Firms with bigger SIZE are expected to show higher level 
of disclosure compared to their smaller counterparts (Foster, 1986). Firms with higher LEV are expected to disclose 
more diligently to minimize their legal responsibilities (Bradbury, 1992). Firms with higher ROA are expected to be 
less motivated to disclose unfaithfully as they are more likely to volunteer to disclose. LIST has been added to control 
firms delisted between the date of UDC designation and 2015. In addition to these variables, firms with highly volatile 
or rapidly growing operating profit or high risk of bankruptcy will have to disclose more contents to investors, which 
is deemed to have an influence on unfaithful disclosure. Therefore, OIVOL, GROW and ZSCORE are controlled. BIG 
are controlled to prevent the auditor’s affiliation to BIG accounting firms from influencing disclosure quality. 
 
3.2 Sampling 
 
For this study, we collected data such as UDC designation, imposed penalty points and accumulated penalty points 
from the Korea Exchange’s electronic disclosure system (kind.krx.co.kr). The information on UDC designation is 
only available from 2000, therefore our empirical analysis related to the designation is conducted for companies listed 
from 2000 to 2015. Meanwhile, since the penalty point and its accumulation were introduced in 2004, the empirical 
analysis about these variables is conducted for data from 2004 to 2015. Proportion of outside directors, percentage of 
foreign and managerial equity ownership used as proxy for corporate governance, and financial data for calculation 
of financial/accounting information used as other controlled variables are from non-financial firms closing in 
December on Korea Listed Companies Association’s TS2000 database. The total samples from 2000 to 2015 used for 
empirical analysis of this study is 22,654 firm-years, and samples from 2004, used for empirical analysis using 
imposed and accumulated penalty points consist of 18,185 firm-years. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Table 1 provides basics statistics of main variables. In this study, values smaller (bigger) than 1% (99%) of the 
distribution of each variable were replaced with 1% (99%) values, in order to reduce the impact of outliers. The 
average of UNFAITH variable, which refers to whether a firm is designated as a UDC, is 0.045, indicating that 4.5% 
of all samples, or 1,019 firm-years, are designated as UDCs. D_SCORE and CD_SCORE basic statistic data are 
collected from 820 companies, as these scores are imposed on companies designated as UDC since 2004. Though not 
provided on Table 1, penalty score imposed within a period is distributed from 0 to 21, and D-SCORE has an average 
of 5.029 and a median of 4. Accumulated penalty score is distributed from 0 to 40, and CD_SCORE has an average 
of 7.023 and a median of 5. The average proportion of outside directors is 0.135, indicating that outside directors take 
up 13.5% of all directors. The average FRGN is 6, showing that foreign investors own an average of 6% of firms’ 
entire equity ownership. The average percentage of managerial equity ownership was 8.4%. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 5% 10% 25% MED. 75% 90% 95% 
UNFAITH 0.045 0.207 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D_SCORE 5.029 5.270 0 0 2 4 7.5 10 11 
CD_SCORE 7.023 8.329 0 0 2 5 10 16 21 
OUTDIR 0.135 0.119 0 0 0 0.125 0.200 0.286 0.333 
FRGN 6.001 11.047 0 0 0.060 0.880 6.080 20.430 32.060 
MNGR 0.084 0.124 0 0 0 0.015 0.134 0.261 0.351 
SIZE 18.593 1.436 16.674 17.006 17.609 18.344 19.306 20.500 21.511 
LEV 0.429 0.229 0.096 0.143 0.254 0.419 0.576 0.703 0.800 
ROA -0.024 0.223 -0.379 -0.188 -0.020 0.027 0.067 0.111 0.143 
LIST 19.563 10.375 6.000 9.000 13.000 16.000 25.00 39.000 41.000 
OIVOL 0.047 0.051 0.003 0.006 0.015 0.031 0.058 0.103 0.149 
GROWTH -0.052 0.400 -1.316 -0.408 -0.064 0.037 0.132 0.252 0.349 
Z-Score -0.862 5.737 -4.969 -4.339 -3.405 -2.375 -0.745 3.423 8.499 
BIG 0.500 0.500 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of the mean, median, and distributions of main variables used in this paper. All variables are winsorized 
at top and bottom one-percentile of the pooled data. 
 
 
Table 2 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between different variables. OUTDIR has a significant positive 
association with UNFAITH, D_score and CD_score, implying that the higher the proportion of outside directors, the 
more likely the firm is to be designated as UDC or get penalty points. On the other hand, FRGN and MNG have a 
significant negative association with UNFAITH, D_score and CD_score, implying that higher percentage of foreign 
or managerial equity ownership leads to relatively lower possibilities of UDC designation and penalty points. 
However, since UNFAITH, D_score and CD_score are reported to have a significant correlation with other controlled 
variables set in the research model, it would be difficult to draw a definitive conclusion on the correlation between 
corporate governance and UDC designation/penalty points, simply based on correlation coefficients between main 
variables on Table 2. Therefore, the final empirical analysis result is reported in the next section, based on the multiple 
regression analysis result considering all variables included in the research model formula. 
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation Between Variables Analyzed 
 UNFAITH D_SCORE CD_SCORE OUTDIR FRGN MNGR SIZE 
D_SCORE 0.664***       
CD_SCORE 0.619*** 0.891***      
OUTDIR 0.034*** 0.022*** 0.028***     
FRGN -0.060*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 0.028***    
MNGR -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.027*** -0.082***   
SIZE -0.114*** -0.116*** -0.120*** 0.094*** 0.460*** -0.109***  
LEV 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.148*** -0.005 -0.096*** -0.161*** 0.123*** 
ROA -0.310*** -0.315*** -0.314*** -0.037*** 0.154*** 0.085*** 0.283*** 
LIST -0.010 -0.015** -0.014** 0.069*** 0.139*** -0.140*** 0.361*** 
OIVOL 0.206*** 0.212*** 0.220*** 0.023*** -0.105*** -0.037*** -0.314*** 
GROWTH -0.043*** -0.066*** -0.066*** 0.065*** 0.089*** 0.014** 0.192*** 
Z-Score 0.266*** 0.275*** 0.275*** 0.019*** -0.133*** -0.042*** -0.275*** 
BIG -0.066*** -0.051*** -0.053*** 0.019*** 0.225*** -0.070*** 0.348*** 
 
(Table 2 continued) 
 LEV ROA LIST OIVOL GROWTH Z-Score 
ROA -0.389***      
LIST 0.149*** 0.026***     
OIVOL 0.160*** -0.495*** -0.086***    
GROWTH -0.040*** 0.263*** 0.145*** 0.006   
Z-Score 0.283*** -0.864*** -0.052*** 0.433*** -0.264***  
BIG -0.015** 0.120*** 0.047*** -0.097*** -0.009 -0.114*** 
Note: This table presents Pearson correlation between the corporate governance variables, i.e. percentage of outside directors, the percentage of 
foreign ownership and that of managerial ownership, designation of unfaithful disclosure corporation, imposition of penalty points on unfaithful 
disclosure corporation designation, and other control variables. ***, ** and * denote the significance level (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10% or less, 
respectively. 
 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis Results 
 
Table 3 shows the logistic regression analysis result on whether UDC designation is impacted by proxy variables of 
corporate governance, namely proportion of outside directors and percentage of foreign/managerial equity ownership. 
Panel A is the result of analysis of all listed companies, and Panel B and C are results of empirical analysis of 
companies on KOSPI and KOSDAQ, respectively. In terms of proportion of outside directors, OUTDIR variable had 
a negative sign at 1% level regardless of markets, implying that higher proportion of outside directors leads to lower 
probabilities of UDC designation. This implies that outside director system checks and balances the management, 
thereby effectively playing the role of reducing errors in timeliness, accuracy and reliability of disclosed information. 
On the other hand, FRGN showed a significant positive sign at 10% level among samples in the overall market and 
KOSDAQ market, indicating that higher foreign ownership leads to higher probabilities of UDC designation. Also, 
Managerial ownership also showed a significant positive sign at 1% level among samples in the overall market, mainly 
attributable to KOSDAQ-listed companies. That is, for companies listed on KOSDAQ, higher managerial ownership 
means higher probabilities of UDC designation. The higher the managerial ownership, the less agency problem there 
is between shareholders and the management (Jensen & Mecking, 1976), which reduces the need for supervising the 
management, pressure for disclosure and therefore the level of disclosure (Mak, 1991), and its quality. This is in line 
with the result of research by Sepasi et al. (2016), which concluded there was significant negative correlation between 
the managerial ownership percentage and disclosure quality. 
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Table 3. Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis (Designated as Unfaithful Disclosure Corporation 𝑈𝑁𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑇𝐻 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽4	𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑅, 𝐹𝑅𝐺𝑁,𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑅 + 𝛽7	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽9	𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽:	𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽;	𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽<	𝑂𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽=	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 +𝛽?𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽@	𝐵𝐼𝐺 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌  
Panel A: KOSPI and KOSDAQ 
Variable Estimate Wald χ2value Estimate 
Wald 
χ2value Estimate 
Wald 
χ2value Estimate 
Wald 
χ2value 
Intercept 17.372 0.00 17.077 0.00 17.527 0.00 17.093 0.00 
OUTDIR -0.978*** 11.66 -1.010*** 12.46     
FRGN 0.009* 2.98   0.008 2.58   
MNGR 1.395*** 17.19     1.410*** 17.48 
SIZE 0.218*** 27.20 0.239*** 36.09 0.215*** 25.72 0.241*** 37.06 
LEV -1.226*** 63.21 -1.295*** 71.80 -1.245*** 65.18 -1.248*** 66.50 
ROA 3.087*** 55.25 3.179*** 57.60 3.231*** 59.13 3.183*** 57.00 
LIST -0.010** 4.97 -0.012*** 7.24 -0.013*** 9.34 -0.012*** 7.08 
OIVOL -3.122*** 28.75 -3.194*** 30.06 -3.251*** 31.11 -3.130*** 28.85 
GROW -0.928*** 65.35 -0.931*** 65.55 -0.932*** 66.00 -0.939*** 67.09 
Z-Score 0.041** 5.23 0.044** 6.09 0.045** 6.36 0.045** 6.14 
BIG 0.315*** 16.53 0.309*** 15.93 0.313*** 16.46 0.333*** 18.46 
Industry & 
Year Dummies Fixed 
Likelihood 
Ratio χ2 1450.0904
*** 1428.0090*** 1418.3484*** 1435.2129*** 
# of Samples 22,654 22,654 22,654 22,654 
 
Panel B: KOSPI 
Variable Estimate Wald χ2value Estimate 
Wald 
χ2value Estimate 
Wald 
χ2value Estimate 
Wald 
χ2value 
Intercept 16.547 0.00 16.220 0.00 16.329 0.00 16.036 0.00 
OUTDIR -1.142** 3.51 -1.161* 3.63     
FRGN 0.006 0.56   0.006 0.65   
MNGR -0.225 0.12     -0.263 0.17 
Control Var. Controlled 
Industry & 
Year Dummies Fixed 
Likelihood 
Ratio χ2 389.8816
*** 388.0499*** 385.0521*** 383.3054*** 
# of Samples 9,346 
 
Panel C: KOSDAQ 
Variable Estimate Wald χ2value Estimate 
Wald 
χ2value Estimate 
Wald 
χ2value Estimate 
Wald 
χ2value 
Intercept -2.266 2.26 -2.689** 3.23 -2.546* 2.83 -2.781* 3.52 
OUTDIR -1.361*** 11.68 -1.394*** 12.32     
FRGN 0.015* 2.83   0.012 2.01   
MNGR 2.028*** 18.97     2.041*** 19.18 
Control Var. Controlled 
Industry & 
Year Dummies Fixed 
Likelihood 
Ratio χ2 1175.4399
*** 1147.9485*** 1135.0319*** 1159.9558*** 
# of Samples 13,308 
Note: This table presents the coefficient estimators of logit regression for corporate governance (OUTDIR, FRGN, MNGR) on unfaithful disclosure 
corporation designation (UNFAITH). ***, ** and * denote the significance level (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10% or less, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4 shows the multiple regression analysis result on whether penalty points for unfaithful disclosure is impacted 
by proxy variables of corporate governance, namely proportion of outside directors and percentage of 
foreign/managerial equity ownership. Similarly, Table 3, Panel A is the result of analysis of all listed companies, and 
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Panel B and C are results of empirical analysis of companies on KOSPI and KOSDAQ, respectively. In terms of 
proportion of outside directors, OUTDIR variable had a significant positive sign at 5% level in the overall market, 
implying that higher proportion of outside directors leads to higher penalty points for unfaithful disclosure. This trend 
is not found among the KOSPI samples on Panel B, but OUTDIR showed a significant positive sign at 1% level on 
Panel C, meaning this correlation is confined to KOSDAQ companies. FRGN showed a significant positive sign at 
5% (10%) level in the overall (KOSPI) market, showing that for KOSPI companies, higher percentage of foreign 
ownership leads to higher penalty points for unfaithful disclosure. This may indicate that if foreign investors, albeit 
their high equity ownership, have a short-term investment propensity, they fail to play a proper monitoring role (Kim 
& Kwak, 2013), and therefore cannot effectively control the quality of disclosed information provided by the 
management. Meanwhile, managerial equity ownership showed a significant negative sign at 5%(1%) level in the 
overall (KOSDAQ) market, indicating that for KOSDAQ companies, higher managerial ownership leads to lower 
penalty points for unfaithful disclosure. 
 
 
Table 4. Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis (D_Score) 𝐷_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽4	𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸(𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑅, 𝐹𝑅𝐺𝑁,𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑅) + 𝛽7	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽9	𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽:	𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽;	𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽<	𝑂𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽=	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 +𝛽?𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽@	𝐵𝐼𝐺 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 	
Panel A: KOSPI and KOSDAQ 
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.675 0.47 0.523 0.36 0.624 0.43 0.524 0.36 
OUTDIR 0.177** 2.20 0.177** 2.20     
FRGN 0.002** 2.26   0.002** 2.33   
MNGR -0.170** -2.17     -0.180** -2.31 
SIZE -0.041*** -4.18 -0.030*** -3.39 -0.038*** -3.97 -0.030*** -3.46 
LEV 0.318*** 6.53 0.308*** 6.44 0.325*** 6.69 0.296*** 6.18 
ROA -1.549*** -16.64 -1.557*** -16.74 -1.566*** -16.84 -1.556*** -16.73 
LIST 0.000 0.21 0.000 0.31 0.001 0.55 0.000 0.30 
OIVOL 1.763*** 8.00 1.805*** 8.21 1.787*** 8.11 1.802*** 8.19 
GROW 0.004 0.14 0.002 0.09 0.004 0.18 0.005 0.21 
Z-Score 0.006* 1.75 0.006* 1.73 0.005* 1.65 0.006* 1.75 
BIG -0.029 -1.40 -0.024 -1.17 -0.028 -1.36 -0.028 -1.35 
Industry and 
Year Fixed 
Adj. R 10.88% 10.85% 10.85% 10.85% 
# of Samples 18,185 
 
Panel B: KOSPI 
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.605 0.38 0.477 0.30 0.655 0.41 0.439 0.28 
OUTDIR 0.037 0.22 0.035 0.21     
FRGN 0.003* 1.87   0.003* 1.82   
MNGR 0.215 1.30     0.205 1.25 
Control Var. Controlled 
Industry and 
Year Fixed 
Adj. R 8.96% 8.93% 8.97% 8.95% 
# of Samples 7,257 
(Table 4 continued on next page) 
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(Table 4 continued) 
Panel C: KOSDAQ 
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.996** 2.50 0.868** 2.23 0.979** 2.46 0.855** 2.20 
OUTDIR 0.375*** 3.15 0.387*** 3.25     
FRGN 0.002 1.35   0.003 1.51   
MNGR -0.267** -2.50     -0.286*** -2.68 
Control Var. Controlled 
Industry and 
Year Fixed 
Adj. R 14.08% 14.03% 13.96% 14% 
# of Samples 10,928 
Note: This table presents the coefficient estimators of regression for corporate governance (OUTDIR, FRGN, MNGR) on penalty points for 
unfaithful disclosure (D_score). ***, ** and * denote the significance level (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10% or less, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5 shows the multiple regression analysis result on whether accumulated penalty points for unfaithful disclosure 
is impacted by proxy variables of corporate governance, namely proportion of outside directors and percentage of 
foreign/managerial equity ownership. Similarly to Table 3, Panel A is the result of analysis of all listed companies, 
and Panel B and C are results of empirical analysis of companies on KOSPI and KOSDAQ, respectively. In terms of 
proportion of outside directors, OUTDIR variable had a significant positive sign at 1% level in the overall market, 
implying that higher proportion of outside directors leads to higher accumulated penalty points for unfaithful 
disclosure. This trend is not found among the KOSPI samples on Panel B, but OUTDIR showed a significant positive 
sign at 1% level on Panel C, meaning this correlation is confined to KOSDAQ companies. FRGN showed a significant 
positive sign at 1% (5%) level in the overall (KOSPI) market, showing that for KOSPI companies, higher percentage 
of foreign ownership leads to higher accumulated penalty points for unfaithful disclosure. Meanwhile, managerial 
equity ownership showed a significant negative sign at 5% (10%) level in the overall (KOSDAQ) market, indicating 
that for KOSDAQ companies, higher managerial ownership leads to lower accumulated penalty points for unfaithful 
disclosure. This illustrates the fact that even though the higher managerial ownership decrease the agency problem 
and the level and the quality of disclosures, however, the lowered disclosure level and the quality of disclosure are not 
serious enough to receive the UDC accumulated penalty points of designating as issues for administration and 
delisting. 
 
 
Table 5. Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis (CD_Score) 𝐶𝐷_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽4	𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸(𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑅, 𝐹𝑅𝐺𝑁,𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑅) + 𝛽7	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽9	𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽:	𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽;	𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽<	𝑂𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽=	𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊 +𝛽?𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽@	𝐵𝐼𝐺 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 	
Panel A: KOSPI and KOSDAQ 
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 1.155 0.55 0.908 0.43 1.067 0.51 0.893 0.42 
OUTDIR 0.353*** 3.00 0.352*** 2.99     
FRGN 0.004*** 2.60   0.004*** 2.65   
MNGR -0.231** -2.03     -0.250** -2.19 
SIZE -0.072*** -5.09 -0.054*** -4.25 -0.069*** -4.86 -0.055*** -4.28 
LEV 0.471*** 6.63 0.451*** 6.47 0.479*** 6.76 0.435*** 6.21 
ROA -2.150*** -15.81 -2.162*** -15.91 -2.178*** -16.04 -2.165*** -15.93 
LIST 0.001 0.80 0.001 0.88 0.002 1.20 0.001 0.94 
OIVOL 3.119*** 9.69 3.185*** 9.92 3.158*** 9.82 3.188*** 9.92 
GROW -0.013 -0.34 -0.014 -0.39 -0.010 -0.27 -0.009 -0.25 
Z-Score 0.009* 1.93 0.009** 1.92 0.009* 1.81 0.009* 1.92 
BIG -0.037 -1.24 -0.030 -1.00 -0.037 -1.23 -0.036 -1.20 
Industry and 
Year Fixed 
Adj. R 10.88% 10.85% 10.85% 10.85% 
# of Samples 18,185 
(Table 5, Panel B continued on next page) 
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(Table 5, Panel B continued) 
Panel B: KOSPI 
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 1.132 0.50 0.871 0.39 1.193 0.53 0.832 0.37 
OUTDIR 0.067 0.28 0.062 0.26     
FRGN 0.005** 2.37   0.005** 2.33   
MNGR 0.245 1.05     0.227 0.97 
Control Var. Controlled 
Industry and 
Year Fixed 
Adj. R 9.28% 9.22% 9.29% 9.24% 
# of Samples 7,257 
 
Panel C: KOSDAQ 
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 1.533** 2.48 1.360** 2.25 1.501** 2.43 1.331** 2.21 
OUTDIR 0.679*** 3.68 0.693*** 3.75     
FRGN 0.003 1.19   0.003 1.32   
MNGR -0.307* -1.85     -0.338** -2.04 
Control Var. Controlled 
Industry and Year 
 Fixed 
Adj. R 13.75% 13.72% 13.63% 13.65% 
# of Samples 10,928 
Note: This table presents the coefficient estimators of regression for corporate governance (OUTDIR, FRGN, MNGR) on accumulated penalty 
points for unfaithful disclosure (CD_score). ***, ** and * denote the significance level (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10% or less, respectively. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In previous chapters, we explored how the corporate governance influence companies’ unfaithful disclosure and UDC 
designation/imposition of penalty points. Using percentage of outside directors, the percentage of foreign ownership 
and that of managerial ownership as a proxy for corporate governance and more detailed data of UDC, we conducted 
an empirical analysis examining the link between corporate governance and UDC designation/imposition of penalty 
points. 
 
Information disclosure are the useful channels to communicate with outside information users to access companies’ 
financial information; thereby, timely and accurate disclosure decrease information asymmetry and enable efficient 
allocation of resources. However, if reliability and accuracy of the information disclosure are not secured, information 
users cannot make reasonable decisions and have difficulties in assessing objective value of the companies based on 
such unreliable source of information. 
 
In Korea, some research has been found in the field of finance and accounting that good corporate governance leads 
to increased level of disclosure (Lee & Sohn 2005; Lee et al. 2012). It has also been conducted on unfaithful disclosure 
system and impacts of UDC designation for the capital market and company’s stakeholders (Lee et al. 2008; Lee et 
al. 2012; Sohn et al. 2012). We used more detailed UDC data and focused on explaining the relationship between 
corporate governance and UDC designation and accumulated penalty points. To empirically test my hypotheses, we 
used firm-year forecast observations from 18,185 companies over the period from 2000 to 2015. We find that there is 
significant negative association between the proportion of outside directors, an indicator of the board’s independence, 
and UDC designation, among companies listed on both KOSPI and KOSDAQ. We interpret this result that outside 
director system checks and balances the management, thereby effectively playing the role of reducing errors in 
timeliness, accuracy and reliability of disclosed information. Regarding the percentage of foreign equity ownership 
showed statistically significant positive association with UDC designation and a significant positive association with 
the imposed and accumulated penalty points among KOSPI-listed companies. This may imply that foreign cannot 
effectively monitor and control the disclosure quality. Lastly, there was a significant positive association between the 
percentage of managerial ownership and UDC designation in the KOSDAQ market. 
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This paper contributes to the existing literature by suggesting that corporate governance mechanism influence the 
designation as UDC and imposition penalty scores on UDC in Korea. In addition, while prior studies are mostly 
limited to the level of disclosures measured by the frequency of disclosure when it comes to explaining the relationship 
between corporate governance and the level of disclosure, this paper focused on a more detailed look by using unique 
unfaithful disclosure corporation data. We believe that our study sheds some lights on the impact of corporate 
governance mechanism on the quality of disclosure and effectiveness of corporate governance to monitor management 
actions in Korea’s stock market.  
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